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Determining When to Start the Clock: The
"Capable of Ascertainment" Standard and
Repressed Memory Sexual Abuse Cases
Powel v. Chaminade College Preparatory, Inc. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In Missouri, for purposes of determining when the statute of limitations
begins to run, a cause of action shall not be deemed to accrue when the al-
leged wrong or breach of duty occurs, but rather when the "damage resulting
therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment." 2 While this test has
governed Missouri tort cases since 1919, when it was explicitly written into
Missouri statutory law, courts have struggled in determining when damages
are "capable of ascertainment" in order to satisfy the test.3
In Powel v. Chaminade College Preparatory, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Missouri attempted to establish a generally applicable, objective standard for
determining when damages are "sustained and . . . capable of ascertain-
ment.",4 While the court succeeded in clearly prescribing a standard, applica-
tion of the standard under the specific facts of Powel set a troubling precedent
in repressed memory sexual abuse cases.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On June 2, 2002, Michael Powel filed suit in the Circuit Court of the
City of St. Louis against Chaminade College Preparatory School ("Chami-
nade"), Father William Christensen, and Brother John Woulfe, for damages
resulting from childhood sexual abuse. 5 Specifically, Powel alleged that Fa-
ther Christensen and Brother Woulfe had regularly and repeatedly engaged in
sexual contact with him while he was a student attending and living at
Chaminade in the 1970s. 6 Further, Powel alleged that Chaminade had inten-
tionally failed to supervise its clergy.7
In the fall of 1973, Michael Powel, then age 15, began attending Chami-
nade College Preparatory School in St. Louis, Missouri, as a boarding stu-
1. 197 S.W.3d 576 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
2. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.100 (2000).
3. See Powel, 197 S.W.3d at 581.
4. See id. at 582.
5. Id. at 579.
6. Id. at 577.
7. Id. at 579.
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dent.8 Michael remained a boarding student until the spring of 1975, when
Chaminade expelled him for selling alcohol to other students at the school. 9 It
was established that before becoming a student at Chaminade, Michael had
been sexually abused numerous times, by both family members and non-
family members. 10
In February 2000, Michael was diagnosed with a brain tumor.11 During
the course of treatment, he regained previously repressed memories of sexual
abuse at the hands of defendants Father Christensen and Brother Woulfe. " In
his suit, Powel alleged that the sexual abuse he had suffered while he was a
student at Chaminade caused post-traumatic stress disorder that subcon-
sciously affected his conduct.1 3 He claimed that this disorder was what
caused him to act out inappropriately, resulting in his expulsion from Chami-
nade and his inappropriate sexual conduct over the succeeding decades. 14 He
also claimed that he was not aware that the prior abuse was the cause or con-
tributing cause for his improper conduct until he regained his repressed
memories in 2000 and began receiving therapy and treatment from a psy-
chologist. 15
Chaminade's attorneys filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming
that his suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 6 Chaminade
pointed out that the report of his own expert psychologist stated that Michael
had remembered being molested until approximately age 17, but then re-
pressed his memories. 17 Powel argued that his claim was not time-barred
8. Id. at 578. Powel was a boarding student at the school between the ages of 15
and 17. Id. Defendants Christensen and Woulfe also lived in Canning Hall on the
property of the school during the time that Powel was a student there. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Once expelled from Chaminade, Michael Powel, then age 17, moved to
the home of a friend and fellow Chaminade student in Springfield, Illinois, where he
was sexually abused by his friend's mother and forced to leave her home. Id. At this
point, Michael felt he was good for nothing but sexual abuse and he began hitchhik-
ing, sometimes receiving money from men for sexual favors. Id. This conduct contin-
ued for the next four years, and Michael Powel continued to display a multitude of
emotional and physical problems prior to the filing of his cause of action. Id. at 578-
79.
11. Id. at 579.
12. Id. Michael Powel specifically recalled five occasions of sexual abuse by
Father Christensen and three occasions of sexual abuse by Brother Woulfe, including
incidents of fondling, oral sex, and sodomy. Id. Michael also recalled Father Christen-
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because he had filed suit only after he was able to ascertain that he had been
abused by the defendants and that the abuse had caused or contributed to his
psychological problems, and therefore was within the statutory period pre-
scribed under Missouri law. 1
8
The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis held that damages resulting
from sexual abuse were sustained and "capable of ascertainment" at the mo-
ment when the sexual abuse occurred. The court also held that the statute of
limitations was not tolled during the time that Michael suppressed his mem-
ory, 19 and therefore, the court granted Chaminade's summary judgment mo-
tion.2 Powel appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern Dis-
trict, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri in order to
resolve the apparent conflict regarding the interpretation of the phrase "sus-
tained and capable of ascertainment."
21
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that, when determining when the
statute of limitations begins to run, the issue is not when the injury occurred
or when the plaintiff subjectively learned of the wrongful conduct and that it
caused an injury, but when a reasonable person would have been put on no-
tice that an injury and substantial damages may have occurred.22 Thus, the
court held that Powel's damages resulting from sexual abuse would not, as a
matter of law, necessarily be found to be "capable of ascertainment" at the
time when the abuse occurred.23 The court subsequently reversed the decision
of the trial court and remanded the case, with instructions to apply the objec-
tive standard for determining when damages are capable of ascertainment.
24
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Developing the "Capable of Ascertainment" Test in Missouri
In 1919, the Missouri Legislature amended the statute of limitations to
read that a "cause of action shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is
done or the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage
resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment." 25 This stan-
18. Id. He also filed affidavits to refute the defendants' contention that Michael
was aware of the sexual abuse he suffered before he repressed his memories. Id.
19. Id. at 579-80.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 580.
22. Id. at 582.
23. Id. at 585.
24. Id. at 586.
25. Thome v. Johnson, 483 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Mo. App. W.D. 1972). See Mo.
REv. STAT. § 516.100 (2000).
2007]
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dard was a sharp departure from the standard that Missouri courts had previ-
ously employed.2 6
Before 1919, in Missouri, the period of limitations began to run on the
date when the wrongful act occurred, and not the date on which the actual
damage was suffered by the plaintiff.27 In Rankin v. Schaeffer, the plaintiff
sought to recover damages for professional negligence on the part of the de-
fendant. 28 The Missouri Court of Appeals looked to English common law to
determine that, when a cause of action alleges a breach of duty and conse-
quential damage, "the statute runs from the time the breach of duty is com-
mitted, and not from the time the consequential damage ensued., 29 Ulti-
mately, the Rankin court held that the "cause of action accrues the moment
the defendant failed to do what he agreed to do."
30
The Missouri courts further clarified this standard in Schade v.
Gehner.31 In Schade, the plaintiff filed an action for damages against the de-
fendant for negligence in examining titles to real estate.32 In determining
whether the plaintiffs right of action for negligence had accrued, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri acknowledged that the law in this area was "fairly
well settled., 33 Citing Rankin, the court held that the "statute begins to run
from the time of the breach, and not from the time the consequential damages
ensued.,
34
Consequently, the 1919 amendment to the Missouri statute of limita-
tions represented a radical departure from the standard prescribed by Rankin
and Schade.35 No longer would a cause of action be deemed to accrue "when
the wrong is done," but rather, the statute of limitations would commence to
run only from the time "when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and
is capable of ascertainment." 36 This "capable of ascertainment" test has re-
26. Thorne, 483 S.W.2d at 661.
27. Id. at 660.
28. 4 Mo. App. 108, 109 (1877).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 110.
31. 34 S.W. 576 (Mo. 1896).
32. Id. at 576.
33. Id. at 578.
34. Id. In further discussing these standards, the Missouri Court of Appeals, in
Fehrenback, stated that Rankin and Schade followed a general rule that "a wrongful
act causing damage which may be sued for at the time sets the statute in motion, and
the same is not postponed because the amount or extent of the damages is not then
ascertained or ascertainable." Thome v. Johnson, 483 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1972). (quoting State ex rel. Fehrenback v. Logan, 190 S.W. 75, 78 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1916) (emphasis added)).
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mained the applicable standard for Missouri tort cases since its adoption in
1919.1
7
Once the "capable of ascertainment" test was incorporated into Missouri
law, and courts were aware that a tort cause of action would not begin to ac-
crue until some time after the initial wrongful conduct, Missouri courts were
faced with the inevitable question of exactly when damages were "sustained
and capable of ascertainment" and how to apply the new standard. In Chemi-
cal Workers Basic Union, Local No. 1744 v. Arnold Savings Bank, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri attempted to answer this question. In Chemical
Workers, the court held that damages are indispensable elements of the
wrongful conduct that occurred, 39 and that they are ascertainable in order to
trigger the running of the statute of limitations "whenever... [the damage]
can be discovered or made known." 40 However, the court cautioned that the
"capable of ascertainment" standard should not be construed to mean that
accrual of a cause of action is postponed until discovery of a wrongful act.41
Rather, once an act has occurred, a plaintiff should make an inquiry and use
reasonable diligence to discover that the act was legally injurious and that a
cause of action had accrued.42 Thus, the statute does not begin to run when
the plaintiff actually discovers injury or wrongful conduct, but when the fact
of damage is capable of being discovered.
After Chemical Workers, the perception arose that the Missouri Su-
preme Court intended the "capable of ascertainment" standard to be synony-
mous with the "discovery" of a wrongful act or the damages resulting there-
from. In Jepson v. Stubbs though, the Supreme Court of Missouri plainly
rejected this idea.43 In Jepson, the plaintiff argued that the statute of limita-
tions should have started to run on the date that he discovered the alleged
negligence. 44 The court recognized that some states had adopted a "discov-
ery" rule for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run, but
that Missouri had no such rule. 45 Ultimately, it held that Missouri has a "ca-
37. Id. at 660. In Thorne v. Johnson, the Missouri Court of Appeals considered
exactly what effect was to be given to the 1919 amendment. Id. In Thorne, the court
stated that "[t]he 1919 amendment had the effect of disapproving" the standards set in
Rankin and Schade. Id. at 661. Further, the Thorne court held that failing to give ef-
fect to the 1919 amendment "would violate the clear intention by the Legislature to
correct an unfair rule which had resulted from the past mechanical application of
ancient legal dogma." Id. at 662.
38. See 411 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. 1966) (en banc) (per curiam).
39. Id. at 163-64.
40. Id. at 164.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 164-65.
43. See 555 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Mo. 1977) (en banc).
44. Id. at 309.
45. Id. at 312.
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pable of ascertainment" test and that, if the legislature had intended to pre-
scribe a "discovery" test, they would have expressly done so.
46
B. Applying the "Capable of Ascertainment" Standard to Childhood
Sexual Abuse Cases
Applying the "capable of ascertainment" standard to childhood sexual
abuse cases is a challenging task for courts to undertake because of the com-
plex and emotional nature of the issues involved. The task becomes especially
challenging when the plaintiffs are adults who suffered some form of sexual
abuse as children and are attempting to bring a lawsuit years later. Another
complicating factor is that many victims of childhood sexual abuse are prone
to involuntary repression of the memories of the abuse, prompting them to
not recall the abuse until later in life. This involuntary repression of memory
leads many victims to file lawsuits against their alleged abusers when they
regain their memory. The lengthy time period between the alleged abuse and
the lawsuits creates problematic statute of limitations issues that the courts
have tried to resolve.
In enacting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.046, the Missouri legislature attempted
to resolve the issue of repressed memories in childhood sexual abuse cases,
and their relation to statutes of limitations. This statute, effective August 28,
2004, prescribed that any action to recover damages for childhood sexual
abuse shall be commenced within ten years of the plaintiff turning twenty-one
or "within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should
have discovered, that the injury . was caused by childhood sexual abuse,
whichever later occurs. ' 7 While this extension of the period of limitations
regarding childhood sexual abuse cases accounts for the often lengthy time
period between the date of the alleged abuse and the subsequent recovery of
repressed memories, it did not resolve the issue entirely.
In Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City, the plaintiff sought
damages for sexual abuse he had suffered as a minor.4a The plaintiff alleged
that he was abused by the defendant priest while he was a minor, and that he
was unable to fully realize that he had suffered physical and emotional inju-
ries related to that abuse until December of 1989, because he had repressed
the memories of the abuse. 4 9 The plaintiff filed a petition alleging a battery
and attempting to bring the action within section 537.046, which had just
been passed in the previous year.50 However, the trial court granted the de-
46. Id. at 312-13. The court looked to the legislative intent behind the "capable
of ascertainment" test to make a plain distinction between it and the "discovery" test
used by the courts of some other states. Id.
47. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.046 (Supp. 2004).
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fendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the suit was barred by Missouri's
two year statute of limitations for battery. 51 The trial court held that section
537.046 was unconstitutional because it allowed plaintiffs to bring claims that
would have already been barred under the previous statute that applied to
childhood sexual abuse cases. 52
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the dismissal, holding that the
previous period of limitations for childhood sexual abuse cases created a
vested right in favor of the defendants to be free from suit, because the limita-
tions period under the old statute had already expired. 53 Therefore, to the
extent that section 537.046 allowed plaintiffs to bring causes of action that
would have been barred under the original statutes of limitation, the court
held that section 537.046 violated the constitutional provision against retro-
spective laws.54
Because of the holding in Doe, Missouri courts were forced to apply ei-
ther a two or five year period of limitations for some childhood sexual abuse
cases. 55 As mentioned earlier, childhood sexual abuse cases often involve
plaintiffs who have involuntarily repressed the memories of the defendants'
wrongful conduct for many years. Therefore, Missouri courts were faced with
the difficult task of determining when these plaintiffs' damages were "sus-
tained and capable of ascertainment," so that courts could determine whether
their cases could be brought, or when they would be barred because the pe-
riod of limitations had expired. The Supreme Court of Missouri case, Shee-
han v. Sheehan,56 dealt with exactly this issue.
In Sheehan, the plaintiff sued her father for damages, alleging that he
had sexually abused her as a child, which resulted in her suffering consequen-
tial physical and emotional injuries.57 The plaintiff also claimed that she in-
voluntarily repressed the memories of the abuse throughout her childhood and
young adulthood until approximately three years before she filed her peti-
58tion. The trial court granted the defendant father's motion to dismiss the
case, reasoning that the plaintiff's claim was not brought within five years
after her 21 st birthday, and was therefore time barred.59
After determining that the trial court had correctly applied the five year
statute of limitations to the case because of the holding in Doe, the Supreme
Court of Missouri considered exactly when the plaintiffs damages were "sus-
tained and suffered" in order to establish whether the plaintiffs petition was
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 342.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See 901 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1995) (en banc).
57. Id. at 57-58.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 58.
2007]
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time barred. 60 The court first noted that the moment at which damages are
ascertainable is an objective determination. According to the court, it was
ambiguous as to when the plaintiff could have discovered or made known her
damages. 62 Therefore, because the plaintiffs damages may not have been
ascertainable until after she regained her repressed memories, her petition did
not clearly indicate on its face that her suit was time barred. Consequently,
the trial court had erred in dismissing her case.63
The Supreme Court of Missouri reached a similar result in K.G. v.
R. T.R., in which the plaintiff alleged that her father had subjected her to inap-
propriate sexual touching as a child.64 The plaintiff alleged that her father had
sexually abused her between the ages of three and seven years, and that she
involuntarily repressed those memories for more than twenty years, until she
regained them in 1990, three years before she filed her petition. 61 The trial
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss after concluding that the two-
66year statute of limitations for battery had expired.
Following an opinion by the Missouri Court of Appeals, the case was
transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri.67 The Supreme Court found
that in cases of involuntary repressed memory, the date the injury occurs may
be later in time than the battery. 68 Further, the court noted that it is the mem-
ory of the consequential injury and damages, and not the memory of the iden-
tity of the perpetrator, that triggers the running of the statute of limitations.
69
Despite this important acknowledgement, the Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs case. The court held that, even if the
statute of limitations was tolled until the plaintiff regained her repressed
memories, the cause of action was still not filed in time.
70
However, not every court in Missouri has steadfastly followed Sheehan
or K.G. For example, in H.R.B. v. Rigali, the plaintiff sued the Archbishop of
the Archdiocese of St. Louis for intentional failure to supervise clergy. 71 He
filed his petition in September, 1994,72 alleging that he had suffered sexual




64. See 918 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
65. Id. at 797.
66. Id. at 798. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.140 (2000) (providing the two-year
statute of limitations for battery).
67. K.G., 918 S.W.2d at 797.
68. Id. at 798.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 798-99.
71. 18 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000). See Weaver v. African Methodist
Episcopal Church, Inc., 54 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (listing the ele-
ments of a cause of action for intentional failure to supervise clergy).
72. H.R.B., 18 S.W.3d at 442.
[Vol. 72
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abuse at the hands of a Roman Catholic priest employed by the Archdiocese
while he was a student at a Catholic grade school in St. Louis in 1964.7' The
plaintiff argued that he had repressed any memories of the abuse until Octo-
ber 1992, and that his repression of memory should toll the statute of limita-
tions until that date. 74 The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and
awarded damages for his claim of intentional failure to supervise, effectively
tolling the five-year statute of limitations that applied to the action. 75 The
defendant Archbishop appealed, arguing that the claim should have been
barred by the statute of limitations and that the plaintiff's damages were "ca-
pable of ascertainment back when he suffered the sexual molestation in the
summer of 1964. "76
The Missouri Court of Appeals began its analysis of the case by ac-
knowledging that whether damages are "sustained and capable of ascertain-
ment at a given time is an objective standard and is a matter of law to be de-
cided by the judge. ' 77 The court then held that the plaintiffs repression of his
memory should not toll the statute of limitations because, when "an overt
sexual assault occurs, the injury and damage resulting from the act are capa-
ble of ascertainment at the time of the abuse."78 Therefore, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed the trial court's decision.
79
IV. TiHE INSTANT DECISION
In Powel v. Chaminade College Preparatory, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Missouri, sitting en banc, sought to answer the question of whether Michael
Powel's claims against the respondents for intentional failure to supervise
clergy were barred by Missouri's five-year tort statute of limitations.8 ° All
parties in Powel agreed that Missouri Revised Statutes section 516.120 pro-
vided the five-year statute of limitations that governed Michael Powel's
claim. 8 1 However, the parties disagreed as to when it began to run. 82 This
73. Id.
74. Id. at 444.
75. Id. at 442.
76. Id. at 443.
77. Id. (citing Sheehan v. Sheehan, 901 S.W.2d 57, 58-59 (Mo. 1995) (en banc)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 446.
80. 197 S.W.3d 576 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). Missouri Revised Statutes section
516.120(4) provides a five-year limitations period for "[a]n action for taking, detain-
ing or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for the recovery of specific
personal property, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not aris-
ing on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated." Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120(4)
(2000) (emphasis added).
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was the only question addressed by the Missouri Supreme Court in this
case. 83
The Supreme Court began by citing Missouri Revised Statutes section
516.100, noting that, in Missouri, a cause of action does not accrue until the
damage resulting from a wrongful act is "sustained and is capable of ascer-
tainment. ''8 4 Then, the court acknowledged that the more difficult issue in
resolving the case was to determine what the legislature meant by the phrase
"sustained and ... capable of ascertainment."85 In attempting to resolve this
issue, the court looked to the plaintiff's and the respondents' interpretations
of the phrase.
8 6
Plaintiff Michael Powel argued that the legislature had intended that the
statute of limitations would not begin to run until the victim subjectively be-
came aware that he or she had suffered damages that were caused by the ac-
tions of the specific individuals in question. 87 The court found Michael
Powel's suggested standard to be similar to the "discovery" test that was spe-
cifically rejected in an earlier Supreme Court of Missouri case. 88 Because of
this similarity, the court in the instant case rejected Powel's proposed stan-
dard. 8
9
The respondents argued that the proper interpretation of "capable of as-
certainment" was that the statute begins to run when the sexual abuse alleg-
edly occurred, because that is when the injury could have been objectively
discovered or made known had the plaintiff not repressed his memory of it.
90
The court rejected this proposed interpretation as well. 91 The court reasoned
that, while the respondents were correct in suggesting an objective standard to
be used for determining when a cause of action shall accrue, the test they
proposed would make the statute begin to run at the time of the wrongful act
in almost every sexual abuse case.92 While such a test had been used in the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District and was followed by the
trial court in this case, the Supreme Court of Missouri had previously rejected
tests that allowed for the cause of action to accrue at the time the wrongful act
was done, 93 and did so again in this case. 94 Therefore, after rejecting the
plaintiff's and the respondents' proposed interpretations of what is meant by
83. Id.
84. Id. at 581. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.100 (2000).
85. Powel, 197 S.W.3d at 581.
86. Id. 581-82.
87. Id. at 581.
88. Id. See Jepson v. Stubbs, 555 S.W.2d 307, 313 (Mo. 1977).
89. Powel, 197 S.W.3d at 581.
90. Id. at 581-82.
91. Id. at 582.
92. Id.
93. See Jepson v. Stubbs, 555 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1977); Thorne v. Johnson, 483
S.W.2d 658 (Mo. App. W.D. 1972).
94. Powel, 197 S.W.3d at 582.
[Vol. 72
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"sustained and... capable of ascertainment," the court was faced with clearly
articulating a specific, generally applicable test for determining precisely
when the statute of limitations begins to run in Missouri tort cases such as
Powel.95
After rejecting both the plaintiffs and the respondents' interpretations,
the court looked to its prior holdings to develop a specific test for making the
determination of when damages were "sustained and capable of ascertain-
ment" in Missouri. 96 The court concluded that the statute of limitations be-
gins to run in Missouri when the "evidence was such to place a reasonably
prudent person on notice of a potentially actionable injury." 97
After prescribing this new objective standard for determining when a
cause of action is deemed to accrue, the court then had to apply the standard
to cases like Powel that involved plaintiffs who had repressed their memories
of sexual abuse. 98 In applying its new standard, the court held that, in cases
where the memory of a wrongful act was repressed before the victim had
notice that a wrong had occurred and that substantial damage had resulted,
the claim would not have accrued at the time the victim repressed his or her
memory of the events. 99 The court further held that, only when the victim
regained the repressed memories would he or she have reason to question the
defendant's conduct and have information sufficient "to place a reasonably
prudent person on notice of a potentially actionable injury."' 00 The court con-
cluded that in cases of repressed memory, the relevant inquiry is "when a
reasonable person would have been put on notice that an injury and substan-
tial damages may have occurred and would have undertaken to examine the
extent of the damages." 10 1 The court held that "[a]t that point, the damages
would be sustained and capable of ascertainment as an objective matter." 10 2
After developing a new, objective capable of ascertainment standard,
and determining how to generally apply the standard to repressed memory
cases, the court applied the standard to the instant case. 10 3 Specifically, the
court needed to decide whether the trial court was correct in granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of the respondents, in light of the court's new stan-
dard. 104 The court first noted that, in cases where "different conclusions may
be drawn from the evidence as to whether the statute of limitations has run, it
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Bus. Men's Assurance Co. of Am. v. Graham (BMA), 984
S.W.2d 501, 507 (Mo. 1999) (per curiam).
98. Id. at 584.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting BMA, 984 S.W.2d at 507).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 584-85.
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is a question of fact for the jury to decide."105 The court held that, because of
the parties' differing evidence regarding Michael Powel's repressed memo-
ries, there were significant genuine issues of fact that could not be resolved
on summary judgment. 0 6 The court reasoned that this case, particularly,
could not be resolved on summary judgment because the trial court was with-
out the benefit of the new standard that it had just developed. 107
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the
case to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.108 The court was also clear
in overruling several Missouri Court of Appeals cases, such as the one that
the trial court originally followed in Powel. 109
Following the decision by the majority in Powel, Justice Price wrote a
dissenting opinion, in which he agreed with the trial court's finding that Mi-
chael Powel's claim should have been barred by the applicable statute of limi-
tations. 110 In dissent, Justice Price argued that the majority stated "an 'objec-
tive' standard, but appl[ied] a 'subjective' one.""' He further argued that
under a truly objective standard, a reasonable and competent person in Mi-
chael Powel's position would know soon after the repeated sexual abuse that
he had suffered harm. "l
2
V. COMMENT
In Powel v. Chaminade College Preparatory, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Missouri was faced with the difficult task of interpreting what the Missouri
legislature meant by the phrase that damages must be "sustained and capable
of ascertainment." Before Powel, Missouri courts at all levels had been
inconsistent in determining when damages were "sustained and capable of
ascertainment," and therefore, the court was eager to develop a specific, gen-
erally applicable test to be used in making this determination. 114
While the new standard developed in Powel may be useful in its pur-
ported objectivity, and may in fact accurately state the intent of the Missouri
legislature when they penned the phrase "sustained and ... capable of ascer-
tainment," the Missouri Supreme Court seems to have misapplied its new
objective standard to cases of repressed memory. The apparent purpose of
developing a new standard for determining when damages would be sustained
105. Id. (quoting Lomax v. Sewell, 1 S.W.3d 548, 552-53 (Mo. App. W.D.
1999)).




110. Id. at 592-93 (Price, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 592.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 577-78 (majority opinion).
114. See id. at 581-82.
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and capable of ascertainment was to clear up inconsistency in Missouri case
law. However, in misapplying the new standard in Powel, the Supreme Court
has only complicated the law in repressed memory cases and overruled some
seemingly legally sound case law in the process. In doing so, the court has
potentially opened the door for more spurious claims from plaintiffs, and
allowed for a dangerous level of legal and financial exposure to certain de-
fendants.
In interpreting what the Missouri legislature intended by the phrase,
"sustained and.., capable of ascertainment," the court in Powel rejected two
possible interpretations proposed by the parties in the case. 1 5 The court re-
jected the plaintiffs interpretation because it felt it was too similar to a "dis-
covery" test that has been used as the standard in other states, but had been
specifically rejected in Missouri.1 6 Alternatively, the court rejected the re-
spondents' interpretation because it would have had the effect of making the
statute of limitations begin to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act in
almost all sexual abuse cases.117 The court found the respondents' interpreta-
tion to be too similar to a "wrongful act" test that is rejected in the specific
language of section 516.100, which sets out the "capable of ascertainment"
test that governs Missouri tort cases. 11
8
In rejecting both of the proposed interpretations put forth by the parties
in Powel, the court made a significant logical error. It failed to recognize that
in certain types of cases, proper application of one standard may bring about
the same result as application of a different standard. Specifically, proper
application of the "capable of ascertainment" standard in sexual abuse cases
may cause the statute of limitations to begin running at the same time that it
would begin to run using a "wrongful act" standard. This notion was never
considered in Powel.
The court was quick to reject the respondents' argument that a reason-
able person in Mr. Powel's position could have objectively discovered that he
had been harmed at the time that the alleged sexual abuse took place." 9 The
court's rationale was that a Missouri statute specifically required that "a court
cannot make the time the wrong is done... the time when the cause of action
accrues."'120 In delineating its standard for when damages are capable of as-
certainment, the court was clear to emphasize that the standard is an objective
one that relies on when a reasonable person would be aware that they have
suffered harm. 121 Viewed together with the creation of the new "capable of
ascertainment" standard, the rejection of the respondents' argument reveals a
115. See id.
116. Id. at 581.
117. Id. at 582.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 581-82.
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significant omission in the court's reasoning. The court failed to consider
that, in sexual abuse cases such as Powel, a "reasonably prudent person"
would be put "on notice of a potentially actionable injury" at the time of the
alleged sexual abuse. The respondents in Powel were not asking that the court
apply a "wrongful act" standard that would be inconsistent with Missouri
law; they were merely asking that the court apply the "capable of ascertain-
ment" standard properly. By stating that "a court cannot make the time the
wrong is done.., the time when the cause of action accrues," the court made
an overbroad generalization and failed to consider that many causes of action,
especially those involving a battery, will accrue at the time the wrongful act is
committed, regardless of what test is used to determine its accrual.
After articulating its new "capable of ascertainment" test, the court cited
several cases that supported the new standard. 122 However, the cases cited by
the court are certainly not dispositive of the respondents' contention that sex-
ual abuse victims, such as Michael Powel, should be held to have reasonably
known that they had suffered actionable harm at the time of the alleged sex-
ual abuse.
One of the cases relied on heavily by the Powel court was Business
Men's Assurance Co. v. Graham (BMA). 123 In BM4, the defendant was hired
to install marble panels on the outside of a large office building. 24 The mar-
ble panels were defective at the time of their installation, but the defects were
not visible from the outside and could only be observed if they were removed
from the building. 125 Over twenty years after the panels were installed, the
plaintiff company discovered the defects in the panels and sued the defendant
for negligence and breach of contract. 126 The defendant argued that the claim
was barred because the statute of limitations began to run at the time the
damaged panels were installed. 127 However, the Supreme Court of Missouri
held that the cause of action accrued over twenty years later when the panels
began to fall off of the building.' The court reasoned that at that point the
evidence was such "to place a reasonably prudent person on notice of a po-
tentially actionable injury."129
Another case relied on by the Powel court involved a business executive
who secretly stole money from his employer by committing forgeries;
130
another case involved a defendant who caused his business partners signifi-
cant damage by writing a clause into a contract that the other partners did not
122. See id. at 582-84.
123. 984 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. 1999) (per curiam).
124. Id. at 502.
125. Id. at 502-03.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 506-07.
128. Id. at 508.
129. Id. at 507.
130. See Chem. Worker's Basic Union v. Arnold Sav. Bank, 411 S.W.2d 159
(Mo. 1966) (per curiam).
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know about; 13' and still another involved a defendant who was hired to sur-
vey some property, and did so negligently, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, caus-
ing him damage. 132 All of these cases are alike in that they involve acts of
fraud, deception, or some wrong that is not clearly visible at the time the
wrongful act is committed. In each of the cases, reasonable plaintiffs could
not objectively be held to know that they had been injured at the time of the
wrongful conduct because their injury was somehow hidden from them as a
result of the defendants' actions. In each of these cases, the plaintiffs' cause
of action could not, and should not accrue at the time the wrongful act oc-
curred.
However, cases of sexual abuse are unlike each of the cases cited by the
court in Powel. Sexual abuse often involves acts that are "overt, traumatic,
painful and violent."' 133 By its very nature, this type of abuse usually involves
direct physical contact between the victim and another person and is classi-
fied as a type of battery.' 34 Unlike the wrongful conduct that occurred in the
cases cited by the court, there is nothing hidden or deceptive about most cases
of sexual abuse.
In Justice Price's dissent, the explicit nature of the wrongful conduct in
sexual abuse cases caused him to apply the court's new objective standard
differently than the majority.' 35 Justice Price cited Justice Holstein's dissent-
ing opinion in Sheehan before arguing that, while the majority in Powel
"state[d] an 'objective' standard, [it] appl[ied] a 'subjective one. ' ,, 136 He ar-
gued that, under an objective standard, "a reasonable and competent 15-to-17-
year-old man would know that he suffered harm from repeated sexual abuse
by his teachers" at school. 137 Justice Price acknowledged that, if the victim
was a younger child or incompetent in some way, then the victim might not
know that he or she had been damaged. In these cases, Justice Price would
argue that the statute of limitations should start to run at a later time. 138 How-
ever, barring these limited exceptions, the dissent ultimately argued that, if
the court truly applied an objective standard, it would not matter that a par-
ticular plaintiff may have repressed the memories of the alleged sexual abuse;
131. See Dixon v. Shafton, 649 S.W.2d 435 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
132. See Martin v. Crowley, Wade & Milstead, Inc., 702 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1985)
(en banc).
133. See H.R.B. v. Rigali, 18 S.W.3d 440, 443 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000).
134. Id. at 445.
135. See Powel v. Chaminade College Preparatory, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 576, 592-93
(Mo. 2006) (en banc) (Price, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. Similarly, in Sheehan, Justice Holstein argued that, "as a matter of law, a
reasonable 14-year-old competent female should be held to know that she has been
damaged at the time she is sexually assaulted." See Sheehan v. Sheehan, 901 S.W.2d
57, 60 (Mo. 1995) (en banc) (Holstein, J., dissenting).
138. Powel, 197 S.W.3d at 59-60 (en banc) (Price, J., dissenting).
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but rather, the plaintiff should be held to know that they were harmed by sex-
ual abuse at the time the abuse occurred.
Justice Price's view was also the view taken by the Missouri Court of
Appeals in H.R.B. v. Rigali. 139 In H.R.B., the court ruled against a plaintiff
who had repressed memories of sexual abuse for over thirty years before
bringing his cause of action. 140 The court reasoned that, when an "overt sex-
ual assault occurs, the injury and damage resulting from the act are capable of
ascertainment at the time of the abuse."' 4' The decision in H.R.B. was applied
by the trial court in Powel in granting summary judgment in favor of the re-
spondents at the trial level. 142 However, H.R.B. was overruled by the Su-
preme Court in Powel, along with the other Missouri decisions that followed
H.R.B. 143
In overruling H.R.B. and all similar decisions that hold that victims of
sexual abuse should be held to have objectively ascertained that they were
damaged at the time of the wrongful acts, the Supreme Court created a prece-
dent that effectively eliminates the statute of limitations in all repressed
memory sexual abuse cases. By allowing certain plaintiffs to bring a cause of
action after he or she allegedly recovers repressed memories of sexual abuse,
that plaintiff is essentially given an unlimited time to bring the action. The
obvious problems with this are embedded in the logic behind all statutes of
limitation. As the age of the alleged incident increases, the facts of the inci-
dent become increasingly difficult to determine, and witnesses are increas-
ingly hard to procure. By allowing a plaintiff unlimited time to bring a claim,
the potential for spurious claims is increased, and the capability of the court
to determine the truth is greatly reduced. Furthermore, potential defendants in
repressed memory sexual abuse cases face increased exposure to liability
because of these plaintiffs' ability to get their cases over the statute of limita-
tions hurdle and past the summary judgment stage in the litigation process.
In achieving its result in Powel, the Supreme Court of Missouri likely
was influenced by its desire to punish sexual predators, regardless of how
many years have passed since they committed their abusive acts. While bar-
ring plaintiffs who have suffered traumatic psychological and physical dam-
age as a result of sexual abuse from bringing an action can easily be seen as
troubling, a court simply cannot ignore the imposition of a meaningful statute
of limitations in tort actions, regardless of their reason for doing so. However,
based on its holding in Powel, that is precisely what has happened.
139. See 18 S.W.3d at 440.
140. Id. at 446.
141. Id. at 443.
142. See Powel, 197 S.W.3d at 577.
143. Id. at 586.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Powel, the Supreme Court had a very ambitious desire to develop a
generally applicable standard for determining when damages are "sustained
and ... capable of ascertainment" in Missouri. While it may, in fact, have
developed such a standard, its misapplication of its new standard to repressed
memory sexual abuse cases created several unintended consequences that
only further confuse the law in this area. By overruling several Missouri
cases, the Powel court has given certain plaintiffs unlimited time to bring
their actions, as long as they are claiming that they had repressed memories.
While the holding in Powel will certainly be responsible for bringing some
sexual predators to justice, its more significant effect will be to completely
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